Does business abilities of the manager increase efficiency of incentive? by Prost, Émilien
Does business abilities of the manager increase efficiency
of incentive?
E´milien Prost
To cite this version:
E´milien Prost. Does business abilities of the manager increase efficiency of incentive?.
Economies and finances. 2014. <dumas-01074768>
HAL Id: dumas-01074768
https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-01074768
Submitted on 15 Oct 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Does business abilities of the manager increase
efficiency of incentive?
Emilien Prost, Université Lumière Lyon 2 GATE LSE
23/06/2014
Abstract
In this work, we intend to answer the question if ability of the manager increase
efficiency of incentive. We first create a mathematical model on a principal-agent
relationship. The assumption is to consider the performance of the manager as a
source of legitimacy which is a factor that will change the tolerance to inequity of
the agent. Two main prediction of this model are: 1) if the performance of the
manager is lowers than the performance of the agent, every thing held equal the
agent will decrease his effort. 2)if the performance of the manager is lowers than the
performance of the agent, he will have to increase the piece rate he proposes in the
contract to limit the negative impact of his illegitimacy on the agent effort. Then,
we design and make an pilot experiment that attempt to observe in lab the first
prediction of the model. Our preliminary results with a session of 14 participant
are not statistically significant. However, they go in the direction of the theoretical
model and could inspire us to perform other session.
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Introduction
What happens very often in firm and organization, is that the manager before he became
manager was previously a regular employee. And the current employee knows that in the
past his supervisor used to perform the same task than he does himself now. He also
knows that his supervisor had to work very hard and be technically competent to squeeze
out competitors and finally become manager. Intuitively, this fact seems to give a lot of
authority and legitimacy to the manager, so then, the agent is inclined to accept orders.
This is a particular case of merit-based promotion system when the appropriate mea-
sure of deservingness is business abilities. Business abilities are the technical knowledges
of the job. And this technical knowledges become in certain firm the main criteria of
selection of leaders as opposed to management skills or others criteria such as diplomas
or network.
So the question that business ability of the manager could increase the efficiency of
incentive is directly related to that. We choose to study the impact on intrinsic motivation.
In terms of behavioral economics and contract theory the question would be to study if
the illegitimacy of the principal could have a negative impact on the intrinsic motivation
of the agent. In other words does the agent think it’s unfair to have a principal who has
less business abilities that he has himself? In that case will he “make his own justice” by
decreasing his effort?
This issue is related the literature on leadership, authority, legitimacy and to the
literature on Peter Principle. Our work position it self in behavioral economics and human
resources economics. To answer properly to the question it is important to distinguish
the multiplicity of interpretations carried by the expressions "authority","legitimacy"and
"incentive". First, "incentive" in common language is all of kind external reward such
as money, help or external sanction. In our analyze we will focus on basic monetary
incentive. Secondly, we use "business ability" as opposed to management skills. Because
we try to analyze in what case business skill is key factor for general management ability
which would be secondarily based on "pure" management skills like listening skills, general
knowledge and vision etc... Why? Because if the agent has indeed a concern for legitimacy
then, business abilities would impact the key means of management which are incentives.
Thirdly, in the common knowledge, the word authority is derived from the Latin word
auctoritas, meaning invention, advice, opinion, influence, or command. In English, the
word authority can be used to mean power given by the state (in the form of Members of
Parliament, judges, police officers, etc.) or by academic knowledge of an area (someone
can be an authority on a subject). That refers to the Rational-legal authority describe
by Max Weber in sociology. There are then two aspect of authority. One aspect is the
direct power to influence the behavior of other. This power can be given by institution, by
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vote, by political organization. This kind of authority refers to a claim of legitimacy, the
justification and right to exercise that power. But it is mostly a certain type of formal
relationship between one man or group and other people. The second aspect of the
definition is the intellectual and moral authority or the informal authority of leadership.
Here, the authority becomes not a formal relationship but an informal influence based on
capacity. This second aspect could also become actually a source of legitimacy for formal
authority. In our work we will focus on this kind of authority.
Finally, we will considered "legitimacy" of the manager as the fact that his business
ability is superior to the ability of the agent. There are of course others sources of
legitimacy but we won’t take them in account in our work. So in this case, the question
is how the agent compares is own ability with the ability of the principal and how it will
have an impact on his intrinsic motivation.
In management science, the ability of the superior has a potential incentive reinforcer
refers to the theory of transactional leadership which is relevant to describe supervisor
more than executive managers. Indeed, in the transactional leadership, the leader must
focus on the daily relationship with the followers and adapt his style to them. For example,
they need to give them encouragement, reward, self confidence, training and direction
[Van Wart, 2013]
The problem of legitimacy have been also studied in psychology. In 1975 Michener and
Burt studied how legitimacy could determine compliance. They include in their variables,
normativity, coercive power, collective justification but they do not include abilities or
performance variables [Andrew and Burt, 1975]. In 2010, a problem close to legitimacy
has been studied by Jong and Schalk who studied the impact of fairness on behavior
[Jong and Schalk, 2010]. Indeed, they studied how extrinsic motivation can moderate
the impact of perception of unfairness on employee outcomes. Except that the outcome
was not the actual effort of the employee but his intention to quit, or his affective com-
mitment or perceive performance. They made a survey and give a questionnaire to people
to measure the fairness perception. Most questions were about fair reward and fair orga-
nizational changes. Applying the logic of Schalk an Jong [Jong and Schalk, 2010]in the
Principal-Agent framework, we could wonder if an increase of incentive could moderate
the impact of a perception of unfairness due to the manager illegitimacy and more specif-
ically on his business ability. In other words, it would mean that illegitimacy could cancel
in part the impact of incentive on effort by decreasing the intrinsic motivation.
In economics, Schnedler, Wendelin and Vadovic, Radovan have studied in 2011 how
negative response to control disappear when the principal is legitimate. They conjecture
that control is legitimate when it is not aimed to a single agent, or if it protect the
endowment of the principal [Schnedler and Vadovic, 2011]. Thus it is very different than
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our work.
Indeed, our subject is strongly related to the the literature on procedural justice and
distributive justice in social psychology and economics. First research on justice focused
on people’s feelings and behaviors in social interactions flow from their assessments of
the fairness of their outcomes when dealing with others (distributive fairness). John
Thibaut and Laurens Walker study the impact of “procedures” as opposed to “distribu-
tive”justice based on outcome. Procedures was here considered as the mechanism to
allocate outcomes[Thibaut and Walker, 1975]. This idea was developed more recently in
psychology by Tyler and Blader in 2003[Tyler and Blader, 2003] or in economics by Ku
and Salmon [Ku and Salmon, 2013]. The contribution of our work is to use to use the
contract theory framework and study want could be the strategic behavior taking into
account the aversion to illegitimacy. In our case, selection of leaders based on their busi-
ness abilities would be a particular case of procedure. Aversion to illegitimacy would be
interpreted as a concern for a specific form of procedural fairness.
In our model we will considered legitimacy such as a factor of tolerance to inequity.
That’s why our model is inspired by the model of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt ,
the model of Englmaier and Wambach in 2010 , and the model of Vital Anderhub, Simon
Gachter and Manfred Konigstein and it is focused on the idiosyncratic parameter of their
model.
In their model they assume that the intrinsic motivation of agent is function of the
spread of income with the principal. The weight of this spread on the global payoff is a
idiosyncratic parameter of their model. It is the individual tolerance to inequity. Then
in our work we assume this parameter is no longer idiosyncratic but varies according
to the relative ability of the principal compare to the ability of the agent. Thus, the
sensitivity of the agent to inequity increase with illegitimacy of the principal. We make
the assumption is that illegitimacy is not a problem in itself, but the agent start to have
a concern about this when there is inequity. So legitimacy becomes a sharing criterion
of collective gains. Eventually, we have an experimental approach because this fit in the
literature of fairness and we expect some result. We made a pilot experiment with 14
participant. Our preliminary result are statically significant but go in the same direction
than the model. This is an incentive to perform other session.
The two main prediction of our model are:
1- if the principal has no legitimacy, and the inequity of payoff is in favor of the
principal, every thing held equal the agent will decrease his effort.
2- the principal with no legitimacy will have to increase the piece rate he proposes in
the contract to limit the negative impact of his illegitimacy on the agent effort.
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In the first part, we will study that considering "business ability" as a potential
incentive reinforcer follows previous research about authority, legitimacy, leadership and
incentive and how legitimacy is a stake. In the second part, we will explain our model.
In the third part we will describe our experimental design. In the fourth part, we will
explain our result from our pilot experiment.
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1 Literature: Ability of manager as a source of legiti-
macy is a stake for authority and leadership issues
Our work is also related to the litterature on leadership. Some author wrote also about
the utility of a leader. Benjamin E.Hermalin developed in 1998 the concept of leading-
by-example [Hermalin, 1998]. The idea of the paper is to focus the analyze on a team
who the principal/leader belong to. The employees rationally realize that the leader has
a incentive to tell the employees that all activities deserve their fullest effort. Then the
leader has to find a way to convince employee to work more on a specific task which will be
to spend himself several hours working on this task. He shows the example. Jan Potters,
Martin Sefton, Lise Vesterlund developed a similar idea and show that in an experiment
of an endogenous sequential public game, the contribution is generally better than when
the choice is simultaneous because of a following behavior [Potters et al., 2005]. Besides,
Emrah Arbak and Marie Claire Villeval showed in 2011 that randomly chosen leaders are
not less influential than voluntary leaders [Arbak and Villeval, 2007].
In economic literature: authority has been studied from formal relationship aspect
and dilution of power but not from the aspect of legitimacy and competence.
Reichman and Rohling-Bastian study the fact that they are three components of an
incentive system (i.e., performance measurement, rewards, and the allocation of decision
rights). In practice, the authority to decide on these components is frequently distributed
across hierarchical levels, thus requiring to adjust centralized decisions with regard to
decentralized authority. They investigates the centralized design of incentive contracts
when decision authority with respect to the allocation of tasks is delegated to lower
hierarchical levels. It provides an analysis of the optimal allocation of authority (who
should be the boss?) and considers the interdependencies between organizational design
choices and the design of optimal incentives [Reichmann and Rohlfing-Bastian, 2013].
Aghion and Tirole distinguished between different types of authority with respect
to the right to decide and effective control over decisions the distinction arises because
of information asymmetry between the contracting parties. It is usually assumed that
the principal fully retains the right to decide, whereas the agents have effective control
[Aghion and Tirole, 1997].
Wulf analyzes the impact of division managers authority on incentives and finds a
significant positive relation. Most notably, she finds that the pay-to-performance sensi-
tivity for global performance measures (firm sales growth) is four times higher for division
managers with more authority (measured by officer status) compared to those with less
authority. However, she does not find a significant relation with respect to local measures
[Wulf, 2007].
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Theoretical literature has considered cases in which the principal cannot or will not
retain full authority. Melurnad and Reichelstein consider a case of complete delegation
[Melumad et al., ], i.e. the contract design and the task assignment are delegated to
agents, and derive conditions under which the principal does not incur a loss from del-
egation. Moreover, previous literature has shown that when relaxing the assumptions
of the Revelation Principle, decentralization can be optimal for the principal. Benefits
from decentralization then could arise from reducing costly communication and contract
complexity [Laffont and Martimort, 1998].
Authority as been studied in economics mostly in the delegation of power aspect and
decision right aspect. Our work is different. Indeed, as soon as we want to focus on issues
about incentives and transactional leadership, we will work on the intellectual, moral
and informal authority of leadership. This authority and leadership may be based on
competence, the legitimacy and the respect associated with it.
In 2011, Schnedler, Wendelin and Vadovic, Radovan conjecture that control is legiti-
mate when it is not aimed to a single agent, or if it protect the endowment of the principal
. Legitimacy as been also studied in its democratic aspect [Vollan et al., 2013]. Vollan
and Zoo shows that the efficiency of political institutions (democracy and authoritarian
norms) depends on social norms.
In our work we are not focus on control or democratic issues but on competence
as a source of legitimacy that could enhance tolerance to inequity. That lead us to
another literature. The literature on justice and fairness. Initially it has been studied
by social psychology [Thibaut and Walker, 1975]. Economist got interested in that but
mostly stayed focused on “distributive fairness” which is behind the concept of “aversion
to inequity” [Fehr and Schmidt, 2000]. Our work is related to psychological concept of
“procedural fairness” which as been studied in psychology [Tyler and Blader, 2003] but is
very less studied in economics [Ku and Salmon, 2013]. Procedures was considered as the
mechanism to allocate outcomes. Our contribution is to use the framework of principal-
agent theory and intend to construct a mathematical model that could give us prediction
on the strategic behavior for the agent and the principal. In our case, the selection of the
leaders by their business abilities becomes a specific “procedure” that could be interpreted
as “unfair” and then decrease effort of the agent.
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2 The model
To analyze the impact of illegitimacy on intrinsic motivation UA we will use a model
inspired to the model of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt , the model of Englmaier
and Wambach in 2010 . In our model, both agent and principal are risk neutral and the
effort is contractible. We assume that illegitimacy is based on a comparison of relative
performance between the agent and the principal. The legitimacy is related to business
abilities and not on management abilities. It leads us to define I as a coefficient of aversion
to illegitimacy. The main assumptions and limits of the model are:
• The agent and principal are risk neutral, there is no moral hazard,
• There is perfect of information about preferences and performances,
• The relative performance between agent and principal is exogenous,
• There is one task: just the business abilities and no management abilities,
• There is one period
2.1 The intrinsic motivation based on a illegitimacy aversion
2.1.1 Defining illegitimacy aversion
Definition. We define I as a coefficient of aversion to illegitimacy such that:
I(λ, qA, qP ) = λ
qA
qP + qA
(2.1)
In this equation qA is the performance of the agent that the principal can observe and
qP is the performance of the principal. In that case, the agent can observe the performance
qP of the principal. We have defined qP and qA as a parameter in the model. The principal
and the agent can observe performance of each other in a previous period we have assumed
that take their decision with the relative performance of each other. λ is assumed to be
the parameter of individual preference. That leads to a illegitimacy aversion function for
the agent AA:
AA = λ
qA
qP + qA
∆ (2.2)
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∆ is the spread of incomes between the principal and the agent, it captures the concern
for inequity. So, it means that I(λ, qA, qP ) which is a coefficient of aversion to illegitimacy
can be interpreted such as a marginal utility loss for inequity. This marginal utility loss
depends on qA and qP such as the increasing of legitimacy increases the tolerance to
inequity. We will study the properties of this coefficient in the next section.
2.1.2 Properties of the illegitimacy aversion coefficient
We define I(λ, qA, qP ) = λ
qA
qP+qA
. It means that:
if qA = qP , then I(λ, qA, qP ) = λ2
if qA > qP , then I(λ, qA, qP ) > λ2
if qA < qP , then I(λ, qA, qP ) < λ2
if qA = 0, then I(λ, qA, qP ) = 0
if qP = 0, then I(λ, qA, qP ) = λ
First, it means that if the performance of the principal and the agent are equal, then
the concern for illegitimacy I(λ, qA, qP ) is equal to the concern for inequity λ2 of Fehr
and Smith. In that case, there are no concern for illegitimacy anymore so that the only
aversion is on pure inequity. Secondly, If the performance of the principal is inferior to
the performance of the agent, it will enhance the impact of inequity. Thirdly, If the
performance of the principal is higher than the performance of the agent, it will reduce
the impact of inequity.
We also have the following property:
lim
qP→+∞
I(λ, qA, qP ) = 0
lim
qA→+∞
I(λ, qA, qP ) = λ
It means that when the principal has a performance increases to very high level, then
the concern for illegitimacy tend to disappear. It also means that when the performance of
the agent increases to very high level, the concern for illegitimacy asymptotically reaches
towards a fixed amount λ of individual preference for legitimacy.
We finally have property about derivative.
Indeed, for the variations of qP variations:
∂I(λ,qA,qP )
∂qP
= − λqA(qA+qP )2 < 0
∂I(λ,qA,qP )
∂2qP
= 2λqA(qA+qP )3 > 0
That is to say that the impact of the concern for illegitimacy decreases with the
increasing of the principal’s performance. Besides, this is a convex curve. It means that
the illegitimacy increase more if the the principal has very high performance.
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And for the variation of qA:
∂I(λ,qA,qP )
∂qA
= λqP(qA+qP )2 > 0
∂I(λ,qA,qP )
∂2qA
= − 2λqP(qA+qP )3 < 0
It means that the impact of the concern for illegitimacy increases with the increasing
of the agent’s performance. Besides, this is a concave curve. It means that the illegitimacy
increases less fast if the performance of the agent is very high.
2.2 A principal-Agent model with no moral hazard and no risk
aversion
2.2.1 Principal’s payoff function
We will add to a principal-agent model with contractible effort and no risk aversion, our
illegitimacy aversion. The principal payoff PP will not take into account any illegitimacy
aversion.
PP = r(e)− sr(e) (2.3)
e is the level of effort provided by the agent and r(e) is the production function such
that r(e) = reα with r a positive constant and 0 < α < 1 such that the function is
increasing and concave on e. s is the piece rate. This equation does not depend directly
on the performance qP of the principal. Indeed, the principal do not perform the task
himself. So his performance is assumed to have an impact only on intrinsic motivation of
the agent.
2.2.2 Employee’s payoff function
We will add to a standard agent’s payoff function a concern for illegitimacy as a component
of intrinsic motivation. That’s leads to an expected payoff PA:
PA = sr(e)− c(e)− λ
qA
qP + qA
∆ (2.4)
c(e) is cost function of effort such that c(e) = ceβ with c a positive constant and β > 1
such that the function is increasing and convex on e. Besides, if the spread of incomes ∆
is such as∆ = [r(e)− sr(e)]− sr(e) we can write:
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PA = sr(e)− c(e)− λ
qA
qP + qA
[r(e)− 2sr(e)] (2.5)
c(e) is cost function of effort such that c(e) = ceβ with c a positive constant and β > 1
such that the function is increasing and convex on e.
2.2.3 The incentive constraint
To reduce the amount of notation, we will from now write λ qAqP+qA just I. Indeed, I only
depends on parameters of the model. The decision variable are s and e, so this notation
will not change the understanding of the following calculation.
The incentive constraint comes from the maximization for e of the participation con-
straint (PC):
max
e
sr(e)− c(e)− I[r(e)− 2sr(e)] (2.6)
That leads to:
∂PA
∂e = sr
′(e)− c′(e)− Ir′(e) + 2Isr′(e)
∂PA
∂e = r
′(e)(s− I + 2Is)− c′(e)
And taking in account the specific form of the production and cost of effort explained
in the previous section we get:
∂PA
∂e = 0
r′(e)(s− I + 2Is)− c′(e) = 0
(s− I + 2Is)rαe(α−1) = cβe(β−1)
And the result is
e∗ = [
rα
cβ
(s− I + 2Is)]1/(β−α) (2.7)
It means that the equilibrium effort e∗ chosen by the agent will depend on s, on I and
on the parameters of the production function and cost function.
Proposition 1. If the principal has low legitimacy and the inequity is in favor of the
principal, every thing held equal the agent decrease his effort.
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2.2.4 The principal maximization problem and the determination of the equi-
librium s∗
The principal can contract on effort, that is to say that there is no moral hazard problem
present. In this situation the principal wants to maximize his expected profit net of wage
payments and has to obey only the agent’s incentive constraint (IC). Thus the principal
maximization program is:
max
β,e
r(e)− sr(e) (2.8)
s.c. (IC) (2.9)
According to the previous section we know that:
r(e∗) = r[ rαcβ (s− I + 2Is)]
α/(β−α)
= r(s)
Thus we deduce:
r′(s) = r(2I + 1) αβ−α
rα
cβ
[ rαctβ (s−I+2Is)]
α/(β−α)
[ rαcβ (s−I+2Is)]
= (2I+1)(s−I+2Is)
α
β−αr(s)
That leads us to the following equation for the maximization of the principal’s payoff:
∂PP
∂s = (1− s)r
′(s)− r(s)
= r(s)[(1− s) (2I+1)(s−I+2Is)
α
β−α − 1]
Thus, ∂PP∂s = 0 if and only if r(s) = 0 or (1− s)
(2I+1)
(s−I+2Is)
α
β−α − 1 = 0. That leads to:
s∗1 =
I
1 + 2I
(2.10)
s∗2 =
(1 + 2I) ∗ αβ−α + I
(1 + 2I) ∗ αβ−α + (1 + 2I)
(2.11)
s∗1 and s
∗
2 are increasing with I that is to say that the equilibrium piece rate will be
higher if the principal has low legitimacy.
Proposition 2. If the principal has low legitimacy, every thing held equal, at the equi-
librium he will increase the piece rate
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2.2.5 The determination of the equilibrium effort e∗
The equilibrium effort from s∗1 is zero. According to the result from the incentive con-
straint (IC), the equilibrium effort from s∗2 is such that:
e∗2 = [
rα
cβ (s
∗
2 − I + 2Is
∗
2)]
1/(β−α)
= [ rαcβ (s
∗
2(1 + 2I)− I)]
1/(β−α)
Replacing s∗2 by his value it comes:
e∗2 = [
rα
cβ ((
(1+2I) αβ−α+I
(1+2I) αβ−α+(1+2I)
)(1 + 2I)− I)]1/(β−α)
= [ rαcβ (
(1+2I) αβ−α+I
α
β−α+1
− I)]1/(β−α)
= [ rαcβ (
(1+2I) αβ−α+I
β
β−α
− I)]1/(β−α)
= [ rαcβ (
α
β−α+I(
2α
β−α+1−
β
β−α )
β
β−α
)]1/(β−α)
= [ rαcβ (
α+I(2α+β−α−β)
β )]
1/(β−α)
And the result is:
e∗2 = [
rα2
cβ2
(1 + I)]1/(β−α) (2.12)
The equilibrium effort e∗2 increases when the illegitimacy I increase. This is a paradox
but the intuition is that at the equilibrium, the principal with low legitimacy will increase
the piece rate enough to compensate the loss of intrinsic motivation from the agent due
to illegitimacy. Indeed, the equilibrium piece rate s∗2 depend positively on I. In other
words, there is a negative direct effect of I on e∗ and a positive indirect effect through
s∗. At the equilibrium the positive indirect effect will be greater than the negative direct
effect.
Proposition 3. At the equilibrium, the global effect of illegitimacy of the principal on the
effort of the agent is positive. Indeed, the indirect effect through the piece rate is higher
than the direct effect.
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3 The Experimental design
Our objective, is to observe how the “agent” and the “principal” take into account the
variable of legitimacy in their behavior. In our experimental design, we have then two
treatment variables in a within design.
The first treatment variable is the relative performance ratio qAqP+qA . We design a
first stage when every participant perform the same task and then are informed on their
score. During the following stages, stage 2 and 3, there are several periods. Participants
are split in two groups. In one group participants still perform the same task. In the
second group, participants don’t perform the task anymore. During stage 2 and stage 3,
participants of each group are matched with each other. During each period of stage 2
and stage 3, they will have a different partner. A feedback will be displayed showing the
score of each other during stage 1.
The second treatment variable is the piece rate. During stage 2, the piece rate is chosen
randomly by the computer. During stage 3 the piece rate is chosen by the participant
of the group who doesn’t perform the task. In stage 3, we expect endogeneity because
the second prediction of our model says the principal will choose the piece taking into
account his legitimacy. It means that the piece rate may depend on the ratio qAqP+qA and
that increase the complexity of the econometrical work.
In stage 3 we also expect reciprocity. Indeed, the agent may work for reciprocity reason
and not for the money if he knows that the piece has been chosen by the participant of the
other group. The data from stage 3 will be useful only if we make a baseline treatment
with no participants that are not aware of their relative performance
For both reason, endogeneity and reciprocity, we perform the stage 2 with a random
piece rate.
3.1 Controlling qP and qA as exogenous parameters
3.1.1 Tree stages: first stage with no principal-agent relationship will allow
to make performance of all subject exogenous parameter
Stage 1: We make a group of N subjects performing a task, that gives us a ranking
of all participant. In this stage, subjects don’t know that in the following stage there
will be a principal-agent relationship that is to say that there payoff will depend strategic
interaction. The purpose is to create exogenous origin of the observed performance for
the following stage. Indeed, if a subject know at stage 1 that his current action and
performance will impact stage 2 and stage 3 he will start a multi-period strategic behavior
which is actually not captured in the model we made.
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Stage 2: In this stage, subjects plays with each other in a principal-agent games with
real task. During each game, the agent and the principal have information about the
performance of each other during stage 1. We assume that during stage 2, being aware
of that information, subjects will measure the legitimacy of the principal through the
performance they made during this first stage.
We randomly allocate roles of principal and agent. It means that some subject with
very bad performance become principal and some subject with very good performance
become agent. The purpose is to create a set of situation from a principal with complete
legitimacy to the opposite situation. There are nP person that become the nP principal
with each a performance qPi such as i ∈ (1, ..., nP ). And there are nA person that become
the nA agent with each a performance qAj such as j ∈ (1, ..., nA). Each agent is matched
with each principal for a single game of principal agent with a second task. The purpose
is to create a panel data of the agent choice of effort. At each different game in stage 2,
the agent is proposed a piece rate which will be a part of total incomes he made with
his performance. During the stage 2, the piece rate is chosen randomly by the computer.
The purpose is to avoid an an endogeneity issue and reciprocity. Indeed, the theoretical
model give a prediction that the principal will increase the piece rate he propose if he
thinks he is not legitimate. However, the risk is that the agent, aware of the random piece
rate, will have less concern for unfairness and legitimacy of the principal.
Stage 3: In this stage, every things is similar with stage 2 except that the principal
chooses the piece rate himself. We expect endogeneity issue. We also expect reciprocity.
To solve this issue we would need a baseline treatment when agent and principal don’t
obverse their relative performance. We will simply don’t inform them about it. We would
then observe principal choosing the piece rate with no concern for his legitimacy. We did
not do this treatment yet in this research work.
3.1.2 The task: finding the right balance between choosing a tasks that allow
legitimacy and avoiding learning effect.
The participant will performed a computerized real effort task elaborate for the first time
by David Gill and Victoria Prowse in 2012 [Gill and Prowse, 2012]. The purpose of this
task is to move precisely sliders on the screen, using the mouse of the computer.
The purpose is that we want the simplest task as necessary because this kind of task
does not require any specific ability. We want the final score of each subject to be more
representative of the average performance. Indeed, if they were learning, the final score
would not be representative of the performance at the end of the task. And the latter
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could be taken in account later by subject to valuate their legitimacy. That could change
their perception of legitimacy during the task. And so during the first task or during the
second task. That would make qP and qA endogenous variables in the stage 2 which are
exogenous in the mathematical model. So that would create a bias and we want to avoid
that. In stage one, task 1 is used to measure qP and qA. It last 150 seconds. A task is
performed with success if the subject move precisely the slider at the position 50. During
150 seconds he has to do this task a maximum of time. The final score at the end of part
1 is the number of task performed with success.
The same task will be performed during stage 2 and stage 3. Except that the task
will be performed only by 50% of the participant.
3.1.3 Demand effect: do not draw subject’s attention to the legitimacy issue
The purpose here is avoid drawing subject attention on the fact that we want him to take
in account legitimacy in his behavior. Otherwise, we will influence his behavior.
To avoid that we need to be as neutral as possible in our instruction. We will not
inform subjects during stage 1 that then will have interaction with each others during
stage 2. After stage 1, we will inform all subject that they are going to become either
an employee or a manager in the next stage. What is important is not to justify how we
allocate role. We will allocate randomly, but we won’t explicit that. We will also inform
them that, in second stage then will be match so that each agent will play with each
principal.
In the instruction, we will not inform subject about any legitimacy issue. But after
stage 1 we will inform them that in stage 2, they will see each others performance in
stage 1 during the game. So, an agent will be aware of the performance during stage 1
of his principal and when he will change of principal the performance will change too.
Symmetrically, the principal will see the performance of all agent in each game.
3.1.4 Choosing remuneration and resolving the issue of wealth effect (a revoir
avec le random sur stage 2 et 3)
The risk is that the behavior of subject could change in the middle of the experiment if
they know that they have already won money. This is the wealth effect. The problem
could occur in the middle of stage 1, in the middle of stage 2, or between the two stages.
We will use the Random-Selection Methods because this method is easy to administer
and very standard.
So, for stage one, we will inform subjects that the computer chose randomly between
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the several period of stage 2 and stage 3 for determining the payment for these two stages.
As we say in the previous section, we will create a linear production function.
3.2 Session
We made 2 sessions of experiments in the Laboratory of GATE LSE in Ecully in France.
For technical reasons, the data from session 1 are unexploitable. We could only use data
from session 2. There was 14 participants including 10 students from schools of EM
Lyon, ISOTEQ and ITECH and 4 person from the labor force. We paid 5 euros as fixed
payment for people who show up on time. The second session last 1h30.
First, 10 minutes were necessary for the explanation of instructions as we went along
the 3 stages of the experiment. The first stage last during 200 seconds and every par-
ticipant had to perform the task. Then, we gave them instructions for the stage 2 and
read them out loud. Then, 10 minutes were necessary to explain them instruction for the
second stage. The second stage were divided in 4 periods. For the second stage 7 partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to group A and kept performing the task while 7 others
participants were assigned to group B and stop performing any task. The participant of
group B had to declare what performance he expected from the participant of groupA.
At each period, each participant of the group A were assigned to a different participant
of the group B. Each period last 200 seconds. The piece rate were chosen randomly by
the computer.
Finally, we explained them instruction for stage 3 during 10 minutes. During part 3,
participant stay in the same group than in part 2. The participant of group A still had
to perform the same sliders tasks. The participant of group B still had to declare what
performance he expected from the participant of group A. The difference with stage 3 is
that the participant of group B can choose the piece rate himself. Like in stage 2, there
were 4 periods of 200 seconds and at each period each participant of the group A were
assigned to a different participant of the group B.
At the end of the session, the seven participant had to answer a questionnaire with
personnel questions such as age, education, wealth etc...
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Period Subject Score P2 Score P1 Score P1 Coop Sharing Rate Score Ratio
3 11 25 15 35 29% 30%
2 11 22 15 31 57% 33%
2 2 25 22 35 86% 39%
4 12 32 23 35 43% 40%
2 9 25 20 30 43% 40%
1 2 32 22 31 43% 42%
1 9 24 20 28 57% 42%
3 12 28 23 31 29% 43%
1 3 27 27 35 57% 44%
4 2 28 22 28 43% 44%
4 7 27 25 31 43% 45%
1 7 27 25 30 100% 45%
4 3 35 27 30 29% 47%
3 3 31 27 28 57% 49%
Average 28 22 31 51% 41%
Table 1: Result (Score Ratio < 50%)
4 Result
We performed a session with 14 participants. 7 participants were allocated to group A
and 7 participants were allocated to group B. The second stage of the experiment is the
treatment with a random piece rate. This stage last 4 periods of 200 seconds. The third
stage of the experiment is the treatment with a endogenous piece rate. In this treatment,
the participant of the group B can choose the piece rate himself. This stage last 4 periods
of 200 seconds. As said early, for endogeneity issues the data from stage 3 will be useful
only if we make a baseline treatment with no participants that are not aware of their
relative performance. Besides, in this stage, we expect reciprocity from the participants
of group A. So this stage will be more interesting to study the behavior of participants
of group B that is to say, study if they choose the piece taking into account their relative
performance with participants of group A during stage 1.
There is very few data to make a proper analysis so we don’t expect significant result.
In a first part we will make a descriptive analysis of the data of stage 2. In a second part,
in order to illustrate the econometrical strategy that we would have with more data, we
studied the issues of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity with the small sample we
have. We used a fixed effect model and random effect model.
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Period Subject Score P2 Score P1 Score P1 Coop Sharing Rate Score Ratio
3 9 26 20 20 14% 50%
3 8 53 32 30 71% 52%
1 11 19 15 14 43% 52%
2 8 35 32 28 57% 53%
1 12 26 23 20 71% 53%
4 11 20 15 13 43% 54%
2 7 26 25 20 29% 56%
4 9 32 20 14 43% 59%
4 8 45 32 20 29% 62%
2 12 27 23 14 57% 62%
3 2 25 22 13 43% 63%
3 7 24 25 14 14% 64%
2 3 34 27 13 86% 68%
1 8 29 32 13 29% 71%
Average 30 25 18 45% 58%
Table 2: Result (Score Ratio > 50%)
4.1 Data
The data we study here are from the stage 2. There were 7 participants of group A during 4
periods so we have 28 observations. Let’s focus on the case when the relative performance
ratio is such that participants of group A has lower performance than participants of group
B during stage 1.
During stage 2 we observe that on average, the score of participants were 28 whereas
it was 22 during stage 1. Besides, the score of participants of group B were on average 31
so that the relative performance ratio is on average 41%. The piece rate is on average 51%
(c.f. Table 1). That would mean that, participants of group A, when they receive half of
the global income but when participants of group B have better performance than them,
they increase their effort. Besides we observe that the behavior seems not to depend on
the piece rate. Indeed the piece rate has a lot of standard error whereas the variable
Score P2 doesn’t. Finally, we observe that the variable Score P2 seems to be related to
the variable Score P1 and Score P1 Coop (c.f. Figure 4.1). It means that the participant
of group 1 seems to take into account the score of participants of group B during stage 1.
Let’s focus now on the case when the relative performance ratio is such that partic-
ipants of group A have a better performance then participants of group B during stage
1. During stage 2 we observe that on average the score is 30, whereas it was 25 during
stage 1. The relative performance ratio is on average 58%. The piece rate is on average
45% (c.f. Table 2). It would mean that paradoxically, when participants of group B has
a lower score during part 1 than participants of group A, and the piece rate is inferior to
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50%, participants of group A increase their effort. This is not what we expected in view
of previous theoretical prediction we made. But, we can explain this phenomena with
the variable Score P1. Indeed, in all the case when participants of group A have a better
performance than participants of group B, participants of group A has a performance on
average of 25. Whereas, when participants of group A have a lower performance than
participants of group B, their performance during stage 1 was 22 on average. It means
that, participants of group A take in account their own performance during stage 1 more
than the relative performance ratio.
4.2 Econometrics model: unobserved heterogeneity and endo-
geneity issues
In spite of the few data we have, we made an econometrical work with. With our prelim-
inary data, we made an regression with a panel data model such as:
ei,t = β1(
qA
qP + qA
)i,t + β2λi + β2s+ β3q
2
A + ǫi,t (4.1)
Indeed, ei,t is the effort of agent i at the period t. At each period, each agent will
be matched with a different principal and only one time with each principal. So at each
period, the agent will have another principal so that ( qAqP+qA )i,t will change over time
and individuals. Beside, at each period, the agent will have a different piece rate s. λ
will be the individual parameter that create unobserved heterogeneity. It is assumed to
be constant over time and not correlated with the other variables. β3q2A will capture
the concavity of the ratio qAqP+qA . The problem is that after the first stage, we need to
match agent with principal such as we have enough data for each observable ratio qAqP+qA .
Indeed, otherwise while the regression, if all the value of qAqP+qA are very clothed to each
other, we will not observe any thing. In the following section we will focus on this issue.
4.2.1 Endogeneity
Endogeneity might comes from the piece rate s which will depend on ( qAqP+qA )i,t . We
expect this because of the the second prediction of our theoretical model. Indeed, theoret-
ically a principal with no legitimacy will increase the piece rate to balance that because
he is aware of the agent aversion to illegitimacy. He know the agent will decrease his
effort if he observe that the principal has no legitimacy. To resolve this issues we created
a intermediate stage called stage 2 in the experiment when the piece rate is actually not
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Figure 4.1: Result: Score P2. A: Score Ratio and Sharing Rate (Score Ratio < 50%). B:
Score P1 and Score P1 Coop (Score Ratio < 50% ). C: Score, Score Ratio, Sharing Rate
(Score Ratio >50%). D: Score P1 and Score P1 Coop (Score Ratio >50%)
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chosen by the principal but chosen randomly by the computer. Then we are sure that s
do not depend on qAqP+qA .
Another idea to solve the endogeneity issue is to make a baseline treatment when
the participant do not observe their respective performance during stage 1. We would
then observe the behavior without information about legitimacy and then just observe
the direct effect of the piece rate s and maybe some reciprocity behavior. This baseline
treatment would allow us to use the data from stage 3.
4.2.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
The unobserved heterogeneity comes from the idiosyncratic characteristic and more specif-
ically from the λ which is assumed to be stable in the theoretical model. λ is interpreted as
the the maximum tolerance to inequity of each individual. In other word, in our theoreti-
cal framework it means λ is the tolerance to inequity when the principal as no legitimacy
at all. The principal has no legitimacy at all when qA tends to infinite or when qP tend
to zero. We cannot observe the parameter λ in the laboratory.
4.2.3 Fixed effect and random effect model
We used two different model for the regression: a fixed effect model and a random effect
model. The fixed effect model solve the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. The fixed
model will take off the effect of all idiosyncratic characteristics. With a fixed effect
model we get that the value of the coefficient qAqP+qA is -11,91 which is coherent with
the theoretical model. However the P value is 0,277. What is also interesting is that
coefficient of the piece rate is much smaller. Indeed, it is 1,13. And this coefficient is less
statistically significant than qAqP+qA . Indeed, the P value is 0,814.
The problem of the fixed effect model is that the concavity of qAqP+qA is not taken into
account. It means that when qa is high, the impact of a variation of qA on effort trough
qA
qP+qA
is lower. Indeed, to take into account this effect we should make a regression with
the variable q2A which do not depend on period. That why it disappear with a fixed effect
model.
Using a random effect model allow us to take into account the variable q2A and the
concavity of qAqP+qA . We made two random effect model. One without adding personnel
informations and one without personnel informations. Those information were collected
during the questionnaire at the end of the session. The personnel information allows us
to take into account heterogeneity. Indeed, in a random effect, heterogeneity is canceled
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like in a fixed model.
Surprisingly, the P Value of qAqP+qA is lower when we don’t take into account individuals
characteristics. Indeed, it is 0,221 without individual characteristics and 0,263 when we
take into account individual characteristics. It means that the coefficient is more statisti-
cally significant when we don’t take into account individual characteristics. In both cases,
the coefficient is strongly negative. Indeed, the coefficient is -12,606 without individuals
characteristics and -11,91945 when we take into account individual characteristics.
However, we observe that the coefficient of q2A is very statically significant in both case
with a P value almost equal to zero. But the impact on performance is very low because
the coefficient is equal to 0,00246397 when we don’t add individual characteristics in the
regression and equal to 0,0293169 when we do.
The piece rate coefficient, like in a fixed effect model, is still not statically significant
with a P Value of 0,924 and 0,812.
Performance Agent Coeff Std.Err P Value
qA
qP+qA
-11,91 10,64436 0,277
Piece rate 1,134063 4,759314 0,814
Table 3: Fixed effect
Performance Agent Coeff Std.Err P Value
qA
qP+qA
-12,606 10,29699 0,221
Piece rate 0,4247245 4,479325 0,924
q2A 0,0246397 0,0044431 0,000
Table 4: Random effect without individuals characteristics
Performance Agent Coeff Std.Err P Value
qA
qP+qA
-11,91945 10,64436 0,263
Piece rate 1,134063 4,759314 0,812
q2A 0,0293169 0061092 0,000
Age 0,1726364 0,2502832 0,490
Education level 0,5205016 2,332341 0,823
Baccalauréat -3,42944 2,287568 0,134
School 1,616684 2,481582 0,515
Wealth 0,3753724 1,486258 0,801
Table 5: Random effect with individuals characteristics
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Conclusion
The research question of work was: does business abilities of the manager can increase
efficiency of incentive. Our point was to considered business abilities of the manager as
a source of legitimacy that could enhance the tolerance to inequity of the agent. The
tolerance to inequity is in reference with the aversion to inequity of Fehr and Smith.
Our contribution is to assume that the tolerance to inequity, which is assumed to be
idiosyncratic in the Fehr and Smith model, depend actually on a relative performance
ratio.
The implicit question is that a merit-based promotion system in a firm could be more
efficient but paradoxically not because the promotion could be a reward for the employee
that induce a higher effort. Indeed, in our study, that would be because the manager would
then be more legitimate and then respected. This respect would increase obedience. We
did a sharper analysis and distinguish the behavioral aspect of the rational aspect. Indeed,
a rational agent would follow orders of a more competent principal because the competent
principal change implicitly the function of production or the cost of the task. But in our
work we focus in our analyze on the behavioral aspects and intrinsic motivation.
In the first step of our work, we first made a mathematical model that gave us two
main prediction of behavior. The first prediction is that when the performance of the
manager is lowers than the performance of the agent, every thing held equal the agent
will decrease his effort. The second prediction is that if the performance of the manager
is lowers than the performance of the agent, he will have to increase the piece rate he
proposes in the contract to limit the negative impact of his illegitimacy on the agent
effort.
The 5 main assumptions and limits of our model are that: 1) The cost function and
production function are explicit. 2) The agent and principal’s performances are mea-
sured through the same task. 3) The agent and principal’s performances are exogenous.
4) There is perfect symmetry of information about relative performances, effort and pref-
erences. 5)Agent and principal are risk neutral.
In the second step of our work , we designed and performed an experiment. The
experiment was based on 3 stages. The first stage was designed to elicit the exogenous
relative performance when every participant perform the same task to get ranked. In the
second stage, the participant were divided in two groups. One became agents and the
others became principals. In this stage, the piece rate is chosen randomly. This stage is
designed to avoid expectable endogeneity and reciprocity. In stage 3, every things were
similar to stage 2 except that the piece rate were now chosen by the participant of the
group B. The point of this stage was to have an endogenous piece rate and a situation
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closer to the hypothesis of the theoretical model. But this result are not exploitable yet
because of econometrical endogeneity issue. To solve this we should perform another
treatment without elicit to participant there relative performance.
In the econometrical work we only focused on the first prediction of the model. In
other words, we only try to identify the impact of illegitimacy of the principal on the
agent behavior. The main result on stage 2 showed that the coefficient of aversion to
illegitimacy was indeed strongly negative and almost statistically significant. It showed
also that the impact of the coefficient of illegitimacy aversion is much higher that impact of
the piece rate. It showed finally that the impact of the coefficient of illegitimacy aversion
is more statistically significant than the impact of the piece rate. These result goes in the
direction of the theoretical model and could inspire us to perform other session.
This research work set the basis of furthers research.
Indeed, the experiment allowed us to work with a panel data of 7 individuals on 4
period and we hope that with more data we could have statistically significant result.
Besides, we hope that we could increase the standard error of the performance of par-
ticipant during the stage by make this stage longer. So we could observe bigger spreads
between agent’s performance and principal’s performance. That could enhance the legit-
imacy/illegitimacy effect on behavior.
Indeed, theoretically that would be interesting to take off some assumption from the
theoretical model. The first assumption is that the cost function and the production
function are explicit so we could try a more general model. The assumption is that the
agent and the principal perform the same task. We could assume two task, business task
for the agent and management task for the principal, in a production function. That
could be a way to insert management ability as a expected source of legitimacy. We could
also make a 2 periods model, that would make relative performance endogenous. Finally,
we could stop assuming symmetry of information. More specifically, we could assume
that the agent has no information on the performance of the principal. He would then
interpret incentive strategic behavior as a signal on his competence.
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Appendix
Instructions
Nous vous remercions de participer à cette expérience sur la prise de décisions. Vos gains
dépendent de vos décisions et des décisions des autres joueurs. Il est donc important que
vous lisiez attentivement les instructions suivantes. A partir de maintenant et jusqu’à la
fin de l’expérience, nous vous demandons de ne plus communiquer entre vous. Pendant
l’expérience, nous ne parlerons pas d’Euro mais d’UME (Unité Monétaire Expérimentale).
Tous vos gains seront calculés en UME. À la fin de l’expérience, le montant total des UME
que vous avez gagnées sera converti en Euros au taux de: 50UME=1Euro En plus des
gains que vous réaliserez durant l’expérience, vous recevrez une prime de participation
de 5 Euros. Le montant de vos pertes sera couvert par votre prime de participation.
Vos gains vous seront payés en liquide et en privé à la fin de la session. Les autres
28
joueurs ne connaîtront pas le montant de vos gains. L’expérience est divisée en trois
parties. Une fois chaque partie terminée, vous recevrez les instructions pour la partie
suivante. Les décisions prises au cours de l’une des parties de l’expérience pourront avoir
une influence sur le déroulement des parties suivantes. Les parties 2 et 3 comporteront
plusieurs périodes. A chaque période vous obtiendrez un gain. A la fin de la partie 3,
une de ces périodes sera choisie de manière aléatoire pour calculer vos gains des parties
2 et 3. Ainsi votre gain total à la fin de la session sera la somme de vos gains pendant la
partie 1 et des gains d’une période choisie de manière aléatoire pour les parties 2 et 3.
Partie 1:
Vous allez effectuer une tâche plusieurs fois de suite, un maximum de fois. La tâche con-
siste à placer un curseur avec la souris de l’ordinateur sur la position 50 sur un intervalle
allant de 0 à 100 (cf figure 1). Vous serez évalué et rémunéré en proportion du nombre
de tâches que vous aurez effectuées avec succès, à savoir placer un curseur exactement
au niveau 50. Les curseurs seront placés sur plusieurs pages les unes après les autres.
Une fois que toutes les taches d’une page seront exécutées avec succès, une autre page
apparaîtra. Ainsi, vous pourrez réaliser un nombre illimité de tâches.
Pour chaque tâche réalisée avec succès, vous recevrez un gain de 10 UME. Une période
de 60 secondes vous sera laissée pour vous entraîner. Durant cette période d’entraînement,
les tâches réalisées avec succès ne seront pas prises en compte dans vos gains.
Questionnaire de compréhension partie 1:
1) Supposons que vous ayez obtenu un gain de 40 UME pendant la première partie, de
10 UME, 25 UME,30 UME et15 UME pendant les périodes 1 à 4 de la deuxième partie
et de 5 UME, 20 UME, 35 UME et 25 UME pendant les périodes 5 à 8 de la troisième
partie. Parmi toutes les périodes des deuxième et troisième parties, c’est la période 5 qui
est déterminée aléatoirement pour calculer le gain total. Calculez le gain total:
2) Veuillez s’il vous plait cocher si les affirmations suivantes sont vraies ou fausses:
• La tâche consiste à déplacer des curseurs.
• Je peux effectuer un maximum de tâches réparties sur plusieurs pages successives.
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Partie 2:
Durant la deuxième partie, vous serez divisés de manière aléatoire en deux groupes de
joueurs de même taille: le groupe A et le groupe B. La deuxième partie comportera
plusieurs périodes. Au début d’une période, chaque joueur du groupe A est associé à un
joueur du groupe B. L’appariement entre joueur est changé à chaque période. Au sein de
chaque binôme, les joueurs sont informés du nombre de tâches effectuées avec succès par
chacun au cours de la première partie de l’expérience.
Instructions pour un joueur appartenant au groupe A:
Si vous êtes désigné pour appartenir au groupe A, vous continuerez à effectuer la tâche
des curseurs. Le but étant de déplacer un maximum de curseurs au niveau 50 pendant le
temps imparti.
Instructions pour un joueur appartenant au groupe B:
Si vous êtes désigné pour appartenir au groupe B, vous n’effectuez aucune tâche. Vous
percevez une partie des gains du joueur du groupe A. Cette répartition se fera selon un
taux de partage que ni le joueur du groupe A, ni le joueur du groupe B ne peut choisir.
Ce taux sera déterminé aléatoirement. Exemple: Si le taux de partage est de 0.3, alors
pour chaque tâche réussit valant 10 UME, le joueur du groupe A recevra 3 UME et le
joueur du groupe B recevra 7 UME. Les deux joueurs sont informés du taux de partage
au début de la période. Connaissant cette information, le joueur B doit estimer quel est
le nombre de tâches qu’effectuera avec succès le joueur A. Cette estimation ne sera pas
communiquée au joueur A.
Calcul des gains pour la deuxième partie Les gains sont fonction du nombre de tâches
effectuées avec succès et du taux de partage. Exemple :
Supposons que pour une période le joueur A ait effectué 20 tâches avec succès et que
le taux de partage soit de 0.6, nous aurons alors les gains suivants. Gain du joueur A :
0,6 x 20 x 10 UME = 120 UME Gain du joueur B : 0,4 x 20 x 10 UME = 80 UME
Questionnaire de compréhension partie 2:
1) Veuillez s’il vous plait cocher si les affirmations suivantes sont vraies ou fausses:
• Durant la partie 2, l’affectation des joueurs aux groupes A et B se fait en fonction
du nombre de tâches qu’ils ont effectuées avec succès pendant la 1ère partie.
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• Durant la partie 2, l’affectation des joueurs aux groupes A et B se fait au hasard.
• Durant la partie 2, le joueur du groupe A est informé sur le nombre de tâches
réalisées avec succès pendant la première partie par le joueur du groupe B avec qui
il est apparié.
• Durant la partie 2, le joueur du groupe B est informé sur le nombre de tâches
réalisées avec succès pendant la première partie par le joueur du groupe A avec qui
il est apparié.
• Durant la partie 2, les joueurs du groupe A exécutent une tâche et les joueurs du
groupe B n’exécutent pas de tâche.
• Durant la partie 2, les joueurs du groupe A peuvent choisir un taux de partage de
leurs gains avec un joueur du groupe B.
• Durant chaque période, les joueurs du groupe A jouent toujours avec le même joueur
du groupe B.
• Durant la partie 2, les joueurs du groupe A jouent avec un joueur différent du groupe
B à chaque période.
2) Supposons que pour une période le joueur du groupe A ait effectué un score de 15
et que le taux de partage soit de 0,2 alors calculez les gains qui seront attribués :
Au joueur du groupe A : ....................................UME.
Au joueur du groupe B : ....................................UME.
Partie 3:
Durant la troisième partie, vous serez divisés de manière aléatoire en deux groupes de
joueurs de même taille: le groupe A et le groupe B. Les joueurs restent dans le même
groupe que celui dans lequel ils ont été préalablement assignés en partie 2. La troisième
partie comportera plusieurs périodes. Au début d’une période, chaque joueur du groupe
A est associé à un joueur du groupe B. L’appariement entre joueur est changé à chaque
période. Au sein de chaque binôme, les joueurs sont informés du nombre de tâches
effectués avec succès par chacun au cours de la première partie de l’expérience.
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Instructions pour un joueur appartenant au groupe A:
Si vous êtes désigné pour appartenir au groupe A, vous continuerez à effectuer la tâche
des curseurs. Le but étant de déplacer un maximum de curseur au niveau 50 pendant le
temps imparti.
Instructions pour un joueur appartenant au groupe B:
Si vous êtes désigné pour appartenir au groupe B, vous n’effectuez aucune tâche. Vous
percevez une partie des gains du joueur du groupe A. Cependant cette fois-ci, ce sera
vous qui choisirait le taux de partage des gains avec le joueur du groupe A. Ce taux ne
sera donc plus déterminé aléatoirement. Exemple : Si le taux de partage que propose le
joueur du groupe B est de 0.4, alors pour chaque tâche réussie vaut 10 UME, le joueur
du groupe A recevra 4 UME et le joueur du groupe B recevra 6 UME. Les deux joueurs
sont informés du taux de partage au début de la période. Connaissant cette information,
le joueur B doit indiquer quel est le nombre attendu de tâches effectuées avec succès par
le joueur A. Cette estimation ne sera pas communiquée au joueur A.
Calcul des gains pour la troisième partie: Les gains sont fonction du nombre de tâches
effectuées avec succès et du taux de partage. Exemple : Supposons que pour une période
le joueur du groupe A ait effectué un score de 20 et que le taux de partage proposé par
le joueur du groupe B est de 0,6 alors voici les gains qui seront attribués :
Au joueur du groupe A : 0,6 x 20 x 10 UME= 120 UME.
Au joueur du groupe B : 0,4 x 20 x 10 UME= 80 UME.
Questionnaires de compréhension partie 3:
1) Veuillez s’il vous plait cocher si les affirmations suivantes sont vraies ou fausses:
• Vrai Faux Durant la partie 3, l’affectation des joueurs aux groupes A et B se fait
en fonction du nombre de tâches qu’ils ont effectuées avec succès pendant la 1ère
partie.
• Durant la partie 3, l’affectation des joueurs aux groupes A et B est la même que
durant la partie 2.
• Durant la partie 3, le joueur du groupe A est informé sur le nombre de tâches
réalisées avec succès pendant la première partie par le joueur du groupe B avec qui
il est apparié.
32
• Durant la partie 3, le joueur du groupe B est informé sur le nombre de tâches
réalisées avec succès pendant la première partie par le joueur du groupe A avec qui
il est apparié.
• Durant la partie 3, les joueurs du groupe A exécutent une tâche et les joueurs du
groupe B n’exécutent pas de tâche.
• Durant la partie 3, les joueurs du groupe A peuvent choisir un taux de partage de
leurs gains avec un joueur du groupe B.
• Durant la partie 3, les joueurs du groupe B peuvent choisir un taux de partage de
leurs gains avec un joueur du groupe A.
• Durant chaque période, les joueurs du groupe A jouent toujours avec le même joueur
du groupe B.
• Durant la partie 3, les joueurs du groupe A jouent avec un joueur différent du groupe
B à chaque période.
2) Supposons que pour une période le joueur du groupe A ait effectué un score de 30
et que le taux de partage proposé par le joueur du groupe B est de 0,2 alors calculez les
gains qui seront attribués :
Au joueur du groupe A : ....................................UME.
Au joueur du groupe B : ....................................UME.
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